The troubling case of the bomb on a flight from Mogadishu
Last
October, the 224 souls aboard Metrojet Flight 9268 were not so
fortunate. A bomb detonated on the Russian charter flight about 20
minutes after its departure from Sharm el Sheikh International Airport
on Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. A local affiliate of Islamic State (IS) took
credit for the atrocity. No one has yet claimed responsibility for the
Daallo bombing, although suspicion will inevitably fall on the Shabab,
the al-Qaeda-linked militant Islamist group based in the Horn of Africa.
Beyond
the obvious parallels, these two incidents bear one chilling
similarity: both seem to have been perpetrated by airport employees.
Although the Egyptian authorities still deny that Flight 9268 was a
terrorist attack, Reuters reported last month that a mechanic working
for EgyptAir, the country's flag-carrier, is suspected of planting the
device. The nascent Somali investigation, meanwhile, points the finger
of blame at an airport employee who was filmed handing what looks like a
laptop computer to Mr Borleh before he boarded Flight 159. In both
cases, the strategy seems to have been to bypass airport security
altogether by using insider knowledge or access. That contrasts with
most other attacks on civil aviation since 9/11—the 2001 shoe-bomb plot;
the 2006 liquid-bomb plot; the 2009 underpants-bomb plot; and the 2010
cargo-bomb plot—all of which sought to outsmart screening technologies.
It
is hard to say what this means for international civil aviation. These
two incidents, as harrowing as they are, do not yet constitute a trend.
Somalia and Sinai are both troubled parts of the world, so many
Westerners would instinctively presume their airports are dangerous
places to fly from. Daallo and Metrojet, after all, are hardly household
names. Even the pilot of Flight 159—an employee of Hermes Airlines, a
Greek company that operates flights on behalf of Daallo—has slammed
security protocols at Mogadishu Airport. "The security is zero," he told
the Associated Press. "When we park [the plane] there, some 20 to 30
people come to the tarmac … They can put anything inside when passengers
leave the aircraft."
That may soothe nerves for those
flying from London or Washington, DC. But exalting Western aviation
security to a higher stratum than that found in Africa is a delusion.
African airports are not so ramshackle; Western ones not so
impenetrable. Consider how, in 2013, the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) removed Mogadishu Airport from its "Zone 5" list of
dangerous airports. Or how, last year, the Egyptian Civil Aviation
Authority, which oversees Sharm el Sheikh Airport, passed ICAO's safety
audits with flying colours. As far as ICAO, a United Nations agency, is
concerned, Somali and Egyptian airports are up to scratch. Conversely,
last year, American airport screeners failed to detect banned weapons
planted by undercover agents in 67 out of 70 tests. And, in 2011, Rajib
Karim, an employee of British Airways, was jailed for plotting to blow
up aircraft with al-Qaeda. "We need to be very careful that we don't end
up just trying to play politics with this," Philip Baum, editor of Aviation Security International
magazine, told your correspondent after the Metrojet disaster. "You can
get weapons and explosives in the Western world as well."
When
I visited Mogadishu Airport two years ago, I saw none of the chaotic
scenes described by Daallo's disgruntled pilot. To the contrary, I saw a
militarised facility that had redoubled its security diligence out of
an acute awareness of its vulnerabilities. It may seem strange to argue
that an airport in a war zone is safer than one in a Western capital,
but to me the logic rang true. Perhaps I was wrong. Either way, Islamist
terrorists will not limit their aspirations to airports on their
doorsteps. The airline industry as a whole must digest the news that
bombs have detonated on two international flights in the past four
months.
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